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Abstract. Enhancing the service-oriented architecture paradigm with
semantic components is a new field of research and goal of many ongoing
projects. The results lead to more powerful web applications with less
development effort and better user support. While some of these ad-
vantages are without doubt novel, challenges and opportunities for the
security arise. In this paper we introduce a security architecture built
in a semantic service-oriented architecture. Focusing on an attribute-
based access control approach, we present an access control model that
facilitates semantic attribute matching and ontology mapping. Further-
more, our security architecture is capable of distributing the Policy De-
cision Point (PDP) from the service provider to different locations in
the platform, eliminating the need of disclosing privacy-sensitive user
attributes to the service provider. With respect to privacy preferences of
the user and trust settings of the service provider, our approach allows
for dynamically selecting a PDP. With more advanced trusted compu-
ting technology in the future it is possible to place the PDP on user
side, reaching a maximum level of privacy.
1 Introduction
Over the last years information systems developed from large monolithic sys-
tems to dynamic distributed networks. Aside from performance factors, ex-
pected economic benefits are the main reasons for this development. More and
more companies outsource parts of their production chain, which is only possi-
ble with flexible communication infrastructures that provide techniques for dis-
tributed processing. Such infrastructures may be based on the emerging service-
oriented architecture paradigm [1] that allows the registration and discovery of
remote applications which are wrapped into web services.
Along with the development of distributed systems comes the demand for
a flexible security infrastructure which suits the complex concepts of the un-
derlying distributed architecture. Apart from privacy, integrity, availability and
non-repudiation, access control plays a central role in information systems. Due
to the heterogeneous and open character of distributed architectures, access
control is not only a major security component; it emerges to a decisive factor
in developing a trustworthy architecture.
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In this paper our focus is on the development of a distributed security archi-
tecture that facilitates flexible semantic access control. Our goal is to employ
the existing attribute-based access control (ABAC) and enrich it with seman-
tic components residing in the architecture. The architecture further provides
the option of moving the privacy and trust-sensitive Policy Decision Point to a
suitable location.
Our work is carried out in the project Access-eGov1. The project’s goal is to
employ Semantic Web and Peer-to-Peer technologies to build a service-oriented
e-Government architecture that provides distributed registries and semantic dis-
covery of annotated web services. An integral part of this semantic architecture
is a security infrastructure, providing a flexible access control component and
protecting citizens’ privacy.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: In Sect. 2 we discuss the
development and existing approaches of ABAC. We continue with introducing
the concept of semantic service-oriented architectures in Sect. 3. In Sect. 4, we
present a dynamic, semantic-aware security architecture, the main contribution
of this paper. Finally, Sect. 5 describes the building blocks and implementation
details of our prototype system. Section 6 concludes this paper and gives an
outlook on our future work.
2 Attribute-based Access Control
As the attribute-based access control (ABAC) component is the key component
of our security architecture, we lay out the development and give an overview of
ABAC in this section. Furthermore, we pinpoint existing approaches of ABAC
in service-oriented and semantically-enriched settings.
2.1 Access Control
Lopez et al. define access control as ”the prevention of unauthorized use of
a resource, including the prevention of use of a resource in an unauthorized
manner” [2]. Generally, the question of which subject owns permissions to access
a set of objects occurs whenever a number of subjects have to use a number
of objects to fulfill certain tasks. From the early days of multi-user computing
access control emerged to a central security issue and is still a major concern
of modern distributed information systems.
A general access control architecture is introduced by Sandhu and Samarati
[3]. Main actors of this architecture are a subject wanting to access an object, a
database with access policies called the authorization database, and a reference
monitor, that either allows or disallows a subject’s access to an object, based
on data from the authorization database. This architecture is generic enough to
serve as basis for every modern access control system and generally follows one
1 Supported by the European Union, IST Programme, Contract No. FP6-2004-27020
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of the three following security models, namely the Discretionary Access Control
(DAC) model, the Mandatory Access Control (MAC) model or the Role Based
Access Control (RBAC) model [2].
All three of these access control models, however, bear shortcomings that
conflict with certain requirements of modern information systems.
2.2 Development of Attribute-based Access Control
As opposed to aforementioned access control models with static mappings, con-
cepts focusing on subjects’ and objects’ dynamic properties are of importance in
large-scale distributed systems. Those attribute-based access control (ABAC)
policies gained increasing popularity in the last years.
The basic idea of ABAC is based on the comparison of values of selected sub-
ject attributes and object properties (so called subject and object descriptors)
[4]. Descriptors are a construct to ”group” objects and subjects dynamically,
not explicitly by an administrator but implicitly by their attribute or property
values. As an example consider that access may depend on the age of a user. In
this case, privilege assignments to the user cannot be done statically by a secu-
rity administrator but have to be dynamically evaluated by the system based
on the value of some of the attributes, e.g. ”DateOfBirth”. As the user gets
older, his authorization state changes automatically. Access permissions might
even depend on an external attribute, such as ”physical location” of a user in
a mobile environment.
While ABAC cannot be seen in many production environments, it has been
taken up for research several times. Early work by McCollum et al. suggested
a move away from discretionary access control and mandatory access control
to ”user attribute based access control” in the context of access to classified
documents [5]. Throughout the 1990s, a number of researchers explained various
forms of ABAC.
One widespread approach, the attribute certificate-based access control, en-
compasses work with practical implementations which are usually very close
to efforts related to the X.509 / ITU-T [6] notion of attribute certificates, as
presented by Farrell and Housley [7]. Most of the work in this field does not
move too far away from a RBAC approach. Certified attributes are mainly used
as assertions of the presence of certain roles. The main difference to RBAC is
the decentralized management given by the concept of privilege management
infrastructures as is for example explained in [2]. It is important to note that
those approaches do usually not include the concept of the accessed objects
bearing attributes. The interested reader is referred to [8, 9, 10] for a selection
of research in this area.
A further reaching approach in the generic attribute-based access control
propose the move away from the strong RBAC foundations, also including sub-
ject and object attributes in the access decision. Adam et al. showed that digital
libraries need an access control which is not based on roles but on ”qualifications
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and characteristics of users” [11]. The XACML specification [12] is a policy lan-
guage already supporting both subject and resource attributes. This idea was
also taken up in [13] with the ultimate goal of allowing access control decisions
without creating rules for every single resource.
3 Semantic Service-oriented Architecture
The security infrastructure presented in Sect. 4 is built in a semantically-
enriched service-oriented architecture (SOA). As we employ the semantic com-
ponents of this architecture, this section points out the weaknesses of plain
SOAs and introduces the idea of the Semantic Web, resulting in the Semantic
SOA (SSOA) paradigm.
SOAs are considerably flexible with regards to composition of different ser-
vices. The discovery of services, however, is still a tough task. The service user
has to search for relevant services using keywords, if the exact location of a
needed service is not known in advance. Only in rare cases the location of the
service is known from the start, e.g. if it is cached from previous executions or if
it is known at implementation time of a SOA-based application. Consequently,
if the location of a service is neither cached nor agreed upon, the architecture
has to provide means to find matching services.
This discovery process in SOAs is equivalent to information retrieval in the
WorldWideWeb or other networks, with all its problems and proposed solutions
[14]. The current state of the World Wide Web shows that the widespread
mechanisms of using spiders to fetch web pages, indexing them and calculating
a matching score for each query, bears many problems. Most of them are related
to the issue of choosing the correct index terms. While many advanced matching
scores and techniques already exist, the selection of the index terms remains a
big issue. There are many vocabularies to choose from; different organizations
are prone to having different vocabularies.
That is where Tim Berners-Lee’s notion of the Semantic Web comes into
play [15]. His idea was to annotate human-readable web resources with meta-
data bearing a precise semantic. This enables so called web agents to process
web content automatically without any interaction with the user. Aside from
metadata models and a common syntax, a main collar of Tim Berners-Lee’s Se-
mantic Web was the definition of a standardized vocabulary. Such a vocabulary
can be a plain list, a taxonomy - already capable of representing a hierarchy
- or an ontology which features a set of elements with complex relationships
among them.
Applied to the SOA paradigm the Semantic Web approach leads to a se-
mantic service-oriented architecture. The underlying idea is the same as already
proposed by Berners-Lee. Web services are annotated using certain taxonomies
or ontologies to make them machine-readable. Without this machine readabili-
ty, there would be no possibility for a matching based on semantics instead of
plain keywords.
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4 Security Architecture
In the following we introduce our distributed security architecture based on
attribute-based access control (ABAC) and the semantic service-oriented ar-
chitecture paradigm (SSOA). We start this section with a short outline of the
underlying system.
4.1 System Architecture
As mentioned in Sect. 1, the service-oriented architecture (SOA) is a popular
technology to outsource processes to remote locations providing a standardized
representation of services and common mechanisms to register and discover
them. In Sect. 3 we pointed out that SOAs still need to face the issue of different
local vocabularies and index terms. Tim Berners-Lee’s Semantic Web targets
this issue and provides means to define common, machine-readable vocabula-
ries like taxonomies and ontologies. These concepts are employed by SSOAs to
combine the advantages of SOA and the Semantic Web.
Within the scope of the project Access-eGov (see Sect. 1) we developed
a SSOA for a European-wide e-Government scenario. The overall system ar-
chitecture of Access-eGov is depicted in Fig. 1. The Access-eGov architecture
represents a Peer-to-Peer network with physically separated service providers
and a set of supporting nodes. The employment of a Peer-to-Peer network sa-
tisfies the demand for a scalable and well maintainable platform of European
e-Government systems.
Fig. 1. Structural view of the Access-eGov architecture
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Core components of the architecture are the dynamic modules for the dis-
covery, matching and orchestration of services [16]. Supporting components of
the platform are distributed storage facilities. These service and ontology re-
positories facilitate the semantic discovery of services. Annotated services of
the service provider are registered in the service repository. The corresponding
vocabulary used for the annotation is stored in the ontology repositories. For
the semantic discovery the user query is matched with the service attributes
using the corresponding ”local” ontologies. The platform provides so-called on-
tology mediators that enable the mapping of ontologies. It also facilitates the
composition of atomic services into complex scenarios, offering full coverage of
citizens’ life events.
The user communicates with the platform via a digital personal assistant.
This user interface accesses the infrastructure functionality via standardized
interfaces and communicates with the above mentioned components.
4.2 Security Architecture
As the Access-eGov platform deals to a high degree with personal information
and brokers this information between a large base of services, special care has
to be taken in the development of a security architecture. Examining a set of
pilot scenarios we defined the following requirements [17]:
The most important requirement for a security architecture in the described
scenario is that personal information stored and processed in the system is se-
cured from unauthorized access. Furthermore, the architecture has to be scal-
able, as it has to cater for an unspecified but possibly large number of services
in the system. The possibility of adding new dedicated security nodes with-
out reconfiguration of the whole network is very important in this context. A
fundamental requirement of the end users is privacy, especially since the sys-
tem deals with sensitive personal data. The administrators on the other hand
need a system that can be handled with low administrative overhead. If more
than one entity is allowed to issue user credentials, not only the administrative
overhead will be minimized but also competence conflicts among competing
administration authorities can be eliminated.
Implementing these requirements, the following paragraphs will present our
security architecture.
Distributed, Semantically-enriched ABAC To overcome the issue of dif-
ferent vocabularies we target to develop an ABAC approach that processes
semantically-enriched attributes and performs a semantic mapping of attributes
from different vocabularies. Figure 2 presents a picture of our security archi-
tecture. The picture resembles the already presented system architecture with
a focus on the involved security components.
We build our architecture on the ABAC approach standardized by [12]. Af-
ter the discovery of a queried service the user’s personal assistant tries to access
a service on the service provider’s premises. The request is diverted to a Poli-
cy Enforcement Point (PEP) which - after consulting a Policy Decision Point
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Fig. 2. Distributed security architecture with semantic components
(PDP) - grants or rejects access to the resource. To make an access decision,
the PDP retrieves the service provider’s access policy and collects attributes
from both the user and the service, accessing the corresponding Policy Infor-
mation Points (PIP). If attributes from the service requester and the provider
come from domains using the same ontology, the PDP looks up the local on-
tology and performs a semantic matching. If attributes come from sources with
different vocabularies, the PDP accesses the semantic components of the sys-
tem architecture collecting the unknown vocabularies and employing ontology
mediators for the semantic mapping.
An inference engine in the ABAC model, as introduced by Priebe et al. [18],
is a step towards utilizing the potential of Semantic Web technologies in access
control. A first notion of semantic mapping in [13] extends this approach by
introducing the possibility of defining access-control relevant attributes in the
Web Ontology Language (OWL). Domain independence is achieved through
brokering the semantic descriptions using different ontologies. We extend this
approach to encompass many different domains and their respective attribute
combinations. Large-scale SSOAs like Access-eGov benefit from such a semantic
attribute processing, even though the task of mapping attributes given in many
different ontologies is complex.
Privacy and Trust As ABAC approaches usually deal with sensitive user
attributes, we enhance our security architecture with mechanisms protecting
privacy. In our architecture the Policy Decision Point (PDP) gathers all ne-
cessary attributes for an access decision. Protecting privacy, we do not consider
user and service attributes to be stored in the platform. The PDP rather accesses
the involved Policy Information Points (PIP) to collect only the data needed
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for a particular access decision. As the PDP in our generic approach resides
in the domain of the service provider, this controlled disclosure of attributes
guarantees that other information about the user is not transmitted in any
way. This is a first step towards a privacy-sensitive ABAC.
We further this approach by introducing the notion of privacy preferences
in our security architecture. A user can fine-tune his digital personal assistant
with regards to the attributes he wants to transfer under which circumstances
and under which constraints. Circumstances and constraints can for example
involve the context of transmission: A user might rather disclose a social security
number to a bank than to an e-commerce shop. Also technical aspects can
influence user preferences. For certain attributes the user might only approve
a transmission to trusted authorities or via a SSL encrypted connection. A
candidate for a proper language for defining privacy preferences is APPEL (A
P3P Preference Exchange Language) [19], designed within the scope of the
Platform for Privacy Preferences project2 (P3P).
Extending the concept of user privacy preferences, we introduce the idea of
flexible locations of the PDP. As the PDP’s location is generally considered to
be in the service provider’s domain, a distributed ABAC always faces the issue
of service providers reliant on attributes for the access decision and users not
willing to disclose certain attributes, even if they are solely used for the access
decision.
Fig. 3. Security architecture with flexible locations of the Policy Decision Point
2 http://www.w3.org/P3P/
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Our security architecture resolves this issue by giving users and service
providers the possibility to choose from a set of PDPs. There are numerous
potential positions for a PDP, from which we will describe three to show the
extremes that limit the PDP positions. As mentioned above, the most common
location of the PDP is a node of the service provider. This is the best alternative
for the service provider, as it solely controls the entity deciding on the access
control. However, this choice is prone to conflicting with privacy preferences of
the user, as personal information needs to be handed out.
If the PDP is placed on a node between the user and the service provider,
we have the classic concept of a trusted third party, both entities have to rely
on. Based on user’s privacy preferences and the service provider’s trust settings
both parties need to negotiate and agree about an acceptable position of the
PDP in the platform. In this case user attributes for the access decision are
transferred to a third party that does not conflict with his privacy preferences.
The attributes are not disclosed to the service provider itself. As the service
provider loses total control of the access decision, it needs to trust the third
party to a certain level. Figure 3 depicts the scenario of a PDP between the
user and the service provider.
The third and most extreme possibility is to place the PDP on the user side.
This is only possible, if a correct execution of the PDP can be guaranteed to
the service provider. Obviously, this is not viable with current hardware and
operating systems. For this approach ideas of the Trusted Computing Group3
initiative on hardware-secured platforms are of use. Such a platform is able
to execute a PDP in a trusted environment enabling maximum privacy for
the user, as no privacy-sensitive attributes are given away. On the other hand
the necessary level of trust for the provider is guaranteed, as its interests are
secured through the trusted platform. [20, 21, 22] present research in the trusted
computing field.
It is noteworthy that a security architecture flexible enough for arbitrarily
placing PDPs on platform nodes is able to handle the addition of new PDPs
without reconfiguration of the whole network, resulting in improved scalability
of the architecture.
5 Implementation
In the previous sections we laid out a security architecture built in the project
Access-eGov (see Sect. 1). For the evaluation of our architecture we are in the
process of building a prototype security system that is intended to serve as
security facility of the Access-eGov platform. A lively open source community
allows us to reuse existing and proven solutions like the following, which are at
the same time our main building blocks.
Attribute certificates according to the ITU-T Recommendation [6] are a
promising way of relating identities and attributes. [23] proposes an approach
3 https://www.trustedcomputinggroup.org/home
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to a complete attribute certificate framework. In a previous project the authors
have implemented initial X.509 attribute certificate support for the widely used
crypto provider bouncycastle4 which was the main reason for choosing it for
this project. The specific task of attribute certificates in the Access-eGov archi-
tecture is to link attributes to users. A user with a set of attributes and some
additional metadata is what we refer to as a user profile.
The concept of the flexible placement of the Policy Decision Point (PDP)
establishes the need to pass on authorization decisions between requesters and
enforcers of those decisions. The idea of Single Sign On (SSO) ideally fits to this
concept of distribution, as in SSO models the entity doing the access control
decision (the PDP) and the entity making use of the result of that decision
(the Policy Enforcement Point) are not identical as well. The Security Assertion
Markup Language (SAML) [24], used in many SSO projects, is our choice for the
task of passing the authorization decisions between the nodes in our platform.
Before even being able to pass SSO tokens around, the system first needs to
arrive at an access control decision. As previously mentioned, our architecture
partially follows the XACML specification [12]. For this reason, it is a logical
choice to use XACML as the language for our authorization requests and access
control results.
It is not necessary to reinvent ontologies for semantic service-oriented archi-
tectures, because there is a number of promising projects in this area. After a
careful evaluation and selection process, we picked the Web Service Modeling
Ontology (WSMO) [25], including WSMO’s ontology language WSML, for se-
mantically describing our services and the Web Service Execution Environment
(WSMX)5 as the underlying technology platform. While there are very good
reasons for choosing WSMO and WMSX, neither one has any special prepa-
rations for security concepts. Therefore the Access-eGov project will extend
WSMX and to a certain extent WSMO to be able to accommodate our security
infrastructure.
6 Conclusions
Due to the distributed character of modern information systems the require-
ments of a suitable security architecture have changed significantly. Modern
distributed architectures favor security concepts focusing on dynamic attributes
rather than static information. Furthermore, users’ privacy concerns move to
the center of attention, as users are not willing to pass personal information to
every service provider.
In this paper we presented a distributed security architecture in a semantic
service-oriented architecture (SSOA) focusing on dynamic access control. We
built the access control component upon the existing attribute-based access
4 http://www.bouncycastle.org
5 http://www.wsmx.org
Building a Distributed Semantic-aware Security Architecture 11
control model. In order to overcome the issue of diverging attribute vocabu-
laries in a distributed environment, we integrated semantic components of the
underlying SSOA for semantic attribute matching and the mapping of different
ontologies. Furthermore, our approach facilitates the movement of the Policy
Decision Point (PDP) from the service provider to a trusted location in the
architecture. Based on the user’s privacy preferences and the service provider’s
trust settings a PDP can be chosen dynamically.
Future work will involve ways to express and edit privacy preferences on
user side as well as trust settings of the service provider. We further want to
pursue the technical possibility of creating a trusted environment on user side
in order to move the PDP to the user, the ultimate privacy solution.
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